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 At the end of the 1970s, the Italian Communist Party, under the leadership of Enrico 
Berlinguer, seemed to be at the final stage of an uninterrupted march towards legitimacy 
within the Italian political system. After reaching the peak of its electoral popularity, in 
1975-76, it was considered by both Italian and foreign experts to be placed, to quote 
the title of a well known book, ‘on the threshold of government’.1 Far from being 
regarded as a dangerous lair of subversives, it had acquired a reputation as the guarantor 
of the Italian Constitution, even in some sectors of conservative public opinion.2 This 
positive perception of the role of the PCI within the democratic system was mirrored 
by a historiography which was generally favourable to the party. It has been argued that 
the Marxist cultural formation of most Italian historians accounts for this.3 Although 
such a claim is true in some respects - the historiography of the PCI was principally 
compiled by scholars who were not only Marxists but also members of the party 4- the 
description of the PCI as a democratic force was not the consequence of a lopsided 
historiography, but rather rested upon historical events which were interpreted as 
concrete evidence of Italian communists' constant commitment to the defence of peace 
                                                 
1 James Ruscoe The Italian Communist Party, 1976 – 81. On the Threshold of 
Government (London 1982). The expression is taken from the PCI's 1978 congressional 
theses. The book records the failure of the PCI's attempt to get into the national 
Government. However, the author stressed how: ‛… the PCI is one of the most stable 
factors in Italian life. Its permanence is assured, and, given its tradition and structure, it 
has a freedom of manoeuvre which other fixed constants in Italy, such as the Roman 
Catholic Church or the Fiat Company, must envy’, 4. 
2 Nello Ajello Il lungo addio. Intellettuali e PCI 1944 – 1958 (Bari 1979), 110.  
3 Elena Aga Rossi and Gaetano Quagliariello, eds., L’altra faccia della luna. I rapporti 
tra PCI, PCF e l’Unione Sovietica (Bologna 1997), 17 – 19. 
4 A. Agosti ‛L’età dell’oro della storiografia sul partito comunista (1960 – 1989)’ 
Revista de Historia Actual, 6, 6 (2008): 103 – 113. 
and democracy. Palmiro Togliatti, leader of the party from 1930 to 1934, and then 
uninterruptedly from 1938 to 1964, was one of the Fathers of the Italian Constitution 
and the Minister of Justice who, in June 1946, promoted national reconciliation by 
drafting an amnesty which was extended to both partisans and to fascists who had 
committed atrocities during the civil war.5 The PCI had been a supporter of the cause 
of world peace throughout its post-war history, as championed by, for example, the so–
called ‘partisans of peace’ movement;6 and a firm opponent of all political violence, a 
policy coherently maintained under the leadership of Enrico Berlinguer, who had been 
among the most staunch defenders of democracy during the Attacco al cuore dello stato 
(attack on the heart of the state) led by the Red Brigades in the second half of the 1970s.7 
The image of the PCI as a solid pillar of Italian democracy rested, above all, upon 
Togliatti's so-called Svolta di Salerno (Salerno turn) policy, which will be discussed 
later in this article. Today the judgement of historians, along with public opinion, has 
dramatically changed, and a new vision has emerged of the PCI as a non-democratic, 
Stalinist and subversive force: in short, a fifth column. This remarkable shift was partly 
due to the collapse of the Eastern European communist regimes, at the end of the 1980s, 
but it was also a consequence of a major crisis, at the beginning of the 1990s, of the 
                                                 
5 On the Togliatti amnistia see Mimmo Franzinelli L'amnistia Togliatti. 22 giugno 
1946: colpo di spugna sui crimini fascisti (Milano 2006). 
6 On the partigiani della pace movement see Ruggero Giacomini I partigiani della 
pace. Il movimento pacifista in Italia e nel mondo negli anni della prima guerra fredda 
(Milano 1984). See also A. Mariuzzo ‘Stalin and the dove: Left pacifist language and 
choices of expression between the Popular Front and the Korean War (1948 – 1953)’, 
Modern Italy, 15, 1 (February 2010), 21 – 35.  
7 According to Giovanni De Luna the PCI engaged in a ‘lotta senza quartiere’ 
(relentless fight) against terrorism, in Giovanni De Luna Le ragioni di un decennio. 
1969 – 1979. Militanza, violenza, sconfitta, memoria (Milano 2009), 96.  
political parties which had historically been the backbone of the Italian political 
system.8 The sudden and dramatic dissolution of virtually all of these, in the wake of 
the Tangentopoli scandals, urged many scholars to formulate a general reconsideration 
of the republican period and engaged the interest of a wider audience in recent Italian 
history. This curiosity was nourished by mass media and politicians, as many historical 
facts and interpretations, above all those concerning the history of the Italian 
Communist Party, were exploited in the fierce political struggle which redefined the 
parameters of the political system.9 Like never before, historical interpretations of 
the actual contribution of the PCI to the development of the Italian democratic 
system became matters for public discussion. In the meantime, new documents that 
might shed light on the issue were becoming available to historians, thanks to what has 
been defined as ‘the archive revolution’, namely the progressive opening up of the 
Soviet and Comintern archives, from 1991.10 This new evidence, however, made the 
debate even harsher and more ideologically grounded. This was due to the fact that the 
interpretative framework had already been established by journalists and politicians. 
Every new book and essay, therefore, was doomed to be read, and advertised by the 
mass media, almost exclusively for its relevance to the evolving political struggle. As 
Stuart Woolf writes in his recent and compelling investigation of this phenomenon, ‘it 
                                                 
8 Pietro Scoppola La repubblica dei partiti. Evoluzione e crisi di un sistema politico 
(1945 – 1996) (Bologna 2006); see also D. Sassoon ‛Tangentopoli or the 
democratization of corruption: Considerations on the end of Italy’s first republic’, 
Journal of Modern Italian Studies, 1, 1 (1995), 124 – 143. 
9 A. Agosti ‛La nemesi del patto costituente’ in La storia negata. Il revisionismo e il 
suo uso politico, ed. A. Del Boca (Vicenza 2009), 261 – 292. 
10 The expression ‛archive revolution’ is by Giuseppe Vacca ‛Togliatti e la Storia’ in 
Togliatti nel suo tempo, ed. R. Gualtieri; C. Spagnolo and Emilio Taviani (Roma 2007), 
5. 
is quite uncommon for a Western scholar to witness such an unscrupulous public use of 
history like the one currently displayed in Italy’.11 The public and political use of 
history by journalists and politicians eventually affected historiographical 
research. This often occurred independently from the professional ethics of the 
scholars, being a side effect of the highly charged political context. Because they 
were aware that their findings were going to be read through the lense of the 
ongoing political debate, historians were inevitably driven to take sides, either 
emphasizing or glossing over some of their conclusions. On the other hand, some 
right-wing historians engaged more openly with political polemics, and showed a 
blatant tendency to brandish facts and interpretations concerning PCI history as 
a club with which to beat the post-communist Italian left. The Italian 
historiographical debate on the PCI’s democratic nature over the last twenty years is 
therefore, in many respects, a mirror of the tensions which run through the political 
                                                 
11 Stuart J. Woolf ‛Introduzione. La storiografia e la Repubblica italiana’ in L’Italia 
repubblicana vista da fuori (1945 – 2000), ed. S. J. Woolf (Bologna 2007), p. 47. The 
issue of the public use of history has aroused the interest of several Italian historians, 
over the last two decades, see for example Nicola Gallerano L’uso pubblico della storia 
(Milano 1995); Gianpasquale Santomassimo, ed., La notte della democrazia italiana 
(Milano 2003) which contributed to an analysis firstly initiated by J. Habermas 
‛Concerning the public use of history’, New German Critique 44 (Spring - Summer 
1988) (Special Issue on the Historikerstreit): 40-50. The present article adopts the 
definition of ‘public use of history’ offered by Nicola Gallerano in ‘History and the 
Public Use of History’, Diogenes, 42, 4 (Winter 1994), 85: ‘Public use of history 
includes not only the various means of mass communication, each with its own 
particularities… but also the arts and literature; public places such as schools, history 
museums, monuments and urban spaces etc. … which, with more or less clearly 
partisan objectives, endeavour to promote a more or less polemical reading of the past 
as compared to the generally accepted common sense of history and historiography, a 
polemical reading based on the memory of their respective groups”. Within ‘the public 
use of history’ falls the ‘political use of history’, which occurs when ‘history is used 
above all as an instrument of day-to-day political battle’. Ibid., 100.  
system, and is a reflection of a country incapable of coming to terms with its past and 
reaching a shared interpretation of its recent history. 
Contextualising the historiography on the Italian Communist Party since 1991 by 
locating it in the framework of Italian political debate, this article is aimed at 
bringing together two related threads. It will chart how the history of the PCI 
became a political issue and how the PCI’s historiographical reassessment 
intertwined with other highly controversial topics such as the moral and political 
legacy of the Italian resistance and the re-evaluation of the fascist regime. 
Meanwhile, the article will analyse the keys moments of the PCI historiographical 
revision of the nineties, focusing particularly on the issues which contributed to 
the shaping of the current perception of the PCI as a non-democratic political 
party: the Stalinism of Palmiro Togliatti and his subordination to Moscow, the real 
impetus behind the Svolta di Salerno policy. The final section will draw some 
conclusions, discussing how the politicisation of PCI history fundamentally 
affected the historiographical debate surrounding the Italian Communist Party, 




The historiographical reassessment of the PCI of the nineties assumed a political 
character because it originated in the political field, and its roots can be traced in 
the ideological and political friction between the PSI (Partito Socialista Italiano - 
Italian Socialist Party) and the PCI of Enrico Berlinguer at the end of the 1970s. 
Aiming to reverse the progressive political marginalization of the PSI caused by 
Berlinguer's policy of the Compromesso storico, the socialist leader Bettino Craxi 
challenged the PCI on the ideological plane, denouncing the totalitarian character 
of every form of communism as being opposed to the libertarian and non-Leninist 
tradition of the kind of socialism embodied by the PSI.12 This provoked an 
ideological skirmish which coincided with the deterioration of political relations 
between the two historic parties of the Italian left.13 In March 1988, the polemic 
shifted from an ideological to a historical level, following the conference on 
Stalinism and the Italian left organized by Mondo Operaio, a well established 
journal on culture and politics of the Italian Socialist Party. This conference, 
boycotted by communist historians, was explicitly aimed at bringing to historians’ 
attention the issue of the Bolshevik-Stalinist roots of the PCI as a pathway for 
future research.14 A few months later, in June 1988, Achille Occhetto was elected 
secretary of the PCI. In an attempt to arrest the haemorrhage of votes the Italian 
Communist Party had been experiencing since the middle of the decade, the new leader 
committed the party to a process of revision, both of its ideological roots and of its 
history. In order to initiate such a process, shortly after his election, Occhetto gave a 
                                                 
12 On the publication of the so-called Vangelo socialista, attributed to Craxi but 
actually written by Luciano Pellicani, in the magazine l’Espresso, in 1978, see 
Luigi Musella Craxi (Roma, 2007), 155 – 166.  
13 For a general overview about the PCI – PSI quarrel in the 1980s see Simona 
Colarizzi ‘I duellanti. La rottura tra il PCI di Berlinguer e il PSI di Craxi alla 
svolta degli anni ottanta’ in Enrico Berlinguer, la politica italiana e la crisi 
mondiale, ed. F. Barbagallo and Albertina Vittoria (Roma 2007), 107 – 118. 
14 The audio files of the discussions at the conference ‘Lo stalinismo e la sinistra 
italiana’ can be heard at http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/26347/26374-lo-
stalinismo-nella-sinistra-italiana-organizzato-dalla-rivista-mondoperaio 
 
speech during the inauguration of a monument dedicated to Palmiro Togliatti in the 
town of Civitavecchia. While reaffirming the merits of Togliatti in the construction of 
Italian democracy, he also openly denounced Togliatti’s support, during the early period 
of his political activity, for Stalin and his policies.15 Occhetto could not have been 
unaware of the symbolic relevance of the occasion he chose to make his statement. 
Symbolic, too, was the date that l'Unità, the official newspaper of the Italian 
Communist party, chose to publish an article by Biagio De Giovanni, Principal of the 
Università Orientale of Naples and one of the most prominent of Occhetto's advisors, 
entitled ‘Once upon a time there was Togliatti and real communism’: 20 August 1989, 
the eve of the 25th anniversary of Togliatti's death. This was a dramatic transitional 
period for the international communist movement: the Berlin wall was still up, but the 
blood of the Chinese students had already been spilled in Tien An Men square, and the 
crisis of the Eastern European communist regimes had clearly entered its final phase. 
In this context De Giovanni claimed that Togliatti's political thought and praxis were to 
be judged as jointly responsible for the political, economic and social disasters of 
comunismo reale, and therefore invited the Party to put behind it, without further delay, 
Togliatti's cultural and political heritage. The communist leadership was clearly trying 
to redefine the political and cultural background of the party. However, De Giovanni's 
strong statement, instead of being praised by non-communist politicians and 
intellectuals as a positive development, was harshly criticized in several articles 
published immediately afterwards, especially by the official newspaper of the Italian 
                                                 
15 ‛Occhetto: ecco il percorso di Togliatti’, l’Unità, 9 July 1988, 1. 
Socialist Party (PSI) Avanti!.16 It was not De Giovanni's argument which provoked 
discussion, but the communists' attempt to reassess autonomously their historical 
heritage. The large majority of non-communist intellectuals, be they journalists or 
politicians, could not allow the PCI to get rid of its past in such an easy and, in their 
view, painless way, without paying in full the political and electoral price for their past 
ideological mistakes. Significantly, the Socialist Party, still led by Bettino Craxi, was at 
the forefront of this polemical offensive against the PCI, hoping to take advantage and 
fill the traditional electoral gap between the two principal parties of the Italian left. The 
criticism against the PCI and its history was grounded in the assumption that the PCI, 
being a communist party, was at least morally responsible for the crimes perpetrated by 
communists all over the world. Nonetheless, the end of the Italian Communist Party, 
which turned into the Partito Democratico della Sinistra (PDS) during the congress held 
in Rimini (30 January – 3 February 1991),17 did not mark the end of this battle over the 
past and, very soon, it would become clear that the political legitimacy of the post-
communist Italian left could be jeopardized. Achille Occhetto, a few months after the 
new party was established, showed he was aware of this danger and, in an article 
published in l'Unità, vigorously requested an end to the quarrel, and that the matter be 
left to historians:  
Our position over the past is clear: it is now a matter for archives, documents and a 
                                                 
16 See, for example, Gianni Baget Bozzo ‛Dimenticare Togliatti per rimanergli fedeli’, 
on the front-page of Avanti!, 22 August 1989. The article provoked a trenchant 
exchange of views in the pages of l'Unità and Avanti! over the following days. 
17 For a sociological analysis of the PCI in the period 1988 – 1991, which represented 
in many respects a traumatic phase for the grassroots level as well as for the leadership 
of the party see Piero Ignazi Dal PCI al PDS (Bologna 1992), especially 169 – 176. 
job for historians. From a political point of view we have made the greatest possible 
changes. We have squared our accounts with the past. But if there is anybody who 
says that we no longer have the right to exist as a party because of our past, then 
our answer is: you are not looking for historical truth; you are instigating a shameful 
campaign of persecution.18  
Occhetto’s assumption that historical research had to be, almost by definition, free 
from political concerns, proved ill-founded: the historical reassessment of the PCI 
did begin, but with an unmistakable political character. Initially, the interests of 
historians fell on the figure of Palmiro Togliatti. This was rather predictable since the 
leadership of the Italian Communist Party had drawn attention to Togliatti when, at the 
end of the eighties, Occhetto had made a clear-cut attempt to distance the PCI from the 
Stalinist period of its past. Togliatti's biography was, however, scrutinised far more 
deeply than Occhetto would have wished. The eighteen years Togliatti spent in exile in 
Moscow raised questions about his role during Stalin's purge of the thirties, which he 
had survived, unlike the majority of the foreign communist leaders living in the Soviet 
Union at the time. As early as 1991, the historian Gianni Corbi had compiled an accurate 
account of Togliatti’s complicity in endorsing Stalin’s persecution of the USSR’s 
foreign communities, including Italians, in the thirties.19 This did not prevent the 
                                                 
18 Achille Occhetto ‛Rispettate Berlinguer e misuratevi con questo PDS’, l'Unità, 27 
October 1991, 1. Occhetto stressed how the PSI, under the leadership of Pietro Nenni, 
had supported, not unlike the PCI, Stalin and his policies up to 1956. 
19 Gianni Corbi Togliatti a Mosca (Milano 1991). Actually, this issue dated back a long 
time, see for example the investigation by Renato Mieli Togliatti 1937. Le 
responsabilità del leader del PCI nel terrore staliniano (Milano 1964), significantly 
published shortly after the death of Togliatti (e’ sbagliato - cancella). Mieli's book was 
republished in 1988, and this is also quite meaningful as the PCI had started in that year 
that process of self-detachment from Togliatti's heritage that has been described above. 
publication of many essays on this topic, some well documented and balanced,20 others 
written for purely political purposes, such as the prolific production of anti-communist 
pamphlets by Francesco Bigazzi and Giancarlo Lehner, conspicuous for their 
provocative titles as well as for their factionalism.21 The question was whether the 
complicity in Stalin's purge was, for Togliatti, a matter of personal survival,22 or rather 
a genuine adherence to a ruthless praxis judged to be necessary in that particular 
historical phase.23 The issue certainly served, to quote Elena Dundovich, ‘to question 
the democratic legitimacy of the PCI and its heirs, attaching to them an indelible 
stigma’.24 Virtually every episode of Togliatti's period in Moscow has been 
remorselessly investigated, leading to an almost morbid interest among the media in 
any new sensational revelations about Togliatti. The end result was an inevitable and 
regrettable tendency among Italian historians to search for the historical scoop, like the 
famous (or notorious) case of the publication of the letters between Togliatti and 
Vincenzo Bianco by the magazine Panorama, in February 1992.25 
                                                 
20 Elena Dundovich Tra esilio e castigo: il Komintern, il PCI e la repressione degli 
antifascisti italiani in URSS, 1936 – 38 (Roma 1998); Elena Dundovich and Francesca 
Gori Italiani nel lager di Stalin (Bari 2006). 
21 Francesco Bigazzi and Giancarlo Lehner Dialoghi del terrore (Milano 1991); 
Francesco Bigazzi and Giancarlo Lehner La tragedia dei comunisti italiani (Milano 
2000); Francesco Bigazzi and Giancarlo Lehner Carnefici e vittime. I crimini del PCI 
in Unione Sovietica (Milano 2006). 
22 This is what Paolo Pombeni argues in ‛Sul retroterra politico di Palmiro Togliatti. 
Note in margine alla formazione di un leader’, in R. Gualtieri; C. Spagnolo and Emilio 
Taviani, op. cit., 182 - 192. 
23 Elena Dundovich ‛Nel grande terrore. Togliatti dirigente dell’internazionale 
comunista tra le due guerre’, in R. Gualtieri; C. Spagnolo and Emilio Taviani, op. cit., 
124 – 157. 
24 Ibid, 152. 
25 In February 1992, at the beginning of the electoral campaign, the weekly magazine 
Panorama published a selection of the correspondence between Palmiro Togliatti and 
the PCI delegate at the Comintern Vincenzo Bianco, about the conditions of Italian war 
The polemical reappraisal of PCI history was consistent with a parallel historical 
revisionism questioning the anti-fascist character of the Italian Republic and the 
Resistenza, the military resistance against Nazi occupation and the RSI (Repubblica 
Sociale Italiana - the fascist Government) in the years 1943 – 1945.26 The Italian 
Constitution, which was the concrete outcome of the so-called Patto costituzionale, the 
pact among the anti-fascist political parties which had established democratic 
government, was also challenged, because it was regarded by many as responsible for 
what was defined as the degenerazione partitocratica of the First Republic, in which 
parties tended to enjoy greater influence than the parliament and the government.27 The 
Italian Communist Party had grounded its democratic legitimacy in its participation in 
the Resistenza, and the defence of the Constitution had been its most distinctive political 
commitment throughout the republican period: as a consequence, it was evidently 
affected, together with its political heirs, by such revisionism. On a historical level, 
there were some good reasons to embark on a reconsideration of the political 
                                                 
prisoners in Soviet Union. The letters, written in Russian and dated January – February 
1943, were found in a Soviet archive by the journalist Francesco Bigazzi and the 
historian Franco Andreucci. Due to several mistakes in the translation, in one of the 
letters Togliatti seemed to endorse the mistreatment of the Italian prisoners. For a couple 
of weeks the affair monopolized the political debate. Eventually Andreucci admitted 
the mistake and resigned from the office of scientific advisor to the Ponte alle Grazie 
publishing house. See Agosti, ‘La nemesi del Patto costituente’, op. cit., 276 - 79. 
Togliatti's letters, correctly translated, are in Elena Aga Rossi and Victor Zaslavsky 
Togliatti e Stalin. Il PCI e la politica estera staliniana negli archive di Mosca (Bologna 
1997), 165- 66. 
26 On this issue see Filippo Focardi La Guerra della memoria. Le Resistenza nel 
dibattito politico italiano dal 1945 ad oggi (Roma-Bari 2005), 57 – 62; Paolo Pezzino 
‛The Italian Resistance between history and memory’, Journal of Modern Italian 
Studies, 10, 4 (2005), 396 – 412, and especially Philip Cooke The legacy of the Italian 
Resistance (New York 2011), 149 – 189. 
27 Agosti ‘La nemesi del patto costituente’, op. cit, 280 – 81. 
genesis of the republic and to investigate whether the Resistenza had fulfilled its 
role as the moral foundation of Italian democracy.28 Much of the polemic 
surrounding these issues in the nineties was, however, driven by clear political motives, 
and was a direct consequence of the entrance into politics by the media tycoon 
Silvio Berlusconi and of his blatant use of anti-communism as a political weapon. 
In January 1994, Silvio Berlusconi announced, through his television stations, the 
formation of a brand new political party, Forza Italia!, and his decision to run in 
the forthcoming elections, in order to counter a potential victory by the PDS, which 
appeared inevitable after the political earthquake provoked by the mani pulite (clean 
hands) judicial investigations and the consequent disappearance of both the PSI and DC 
(Democrazia Cristiana).29 In the nine-minute message he issued to moderate public 
opinion traumatized by the dramatic and inglorious end of what would be called the 
first republic, Berlusconi claimed that left-wing politicians, defined as ‛orphans and 
nostalgics of communism’, did not have true democratic feelings:  
Left-wingers pretend they have changed, they claim they are liberal-democrats 
now, but it is not true, they are the same as before, their mentality, their culture, 
their deepest beliefs and their behaviour are just the same as before.30 
The battlefield was the past, the history of the PCI and its role in the development of 
Italian democracy: to deny the PCI any democratic credentials was a pretext for 
                                                 
28 Ernesto Galli della Loggia La morte della patria (Roma-Bari 2008). 
29 On mani pulite see Nicola Tranfaglia Anatomia dell’Italia repubblicana (1943 – 
2009), (Città di Castello 2010), 154 – 157.  
30 The Pdf file of the Berlusconi's ‛Discorso della discesa in campo’ (literally ‘Taking 
the field’ speech) of 26 January 1994 at http://docenti.unimc.it/docenti/maria-amalia-
barchiesi/linguaggio-politico/i-discorso. 
weakening the very political legitimacy of the post-communist Italian left at the 
beginning of the second republic31. Because the right wing coalition had little chance 
of winning the election without the decisive contribution of the post-fascists, in 1994 
Berlusconi associated Forza Italia! with the post-fascist Movimento Sociale Italiano 
(MSI), soon to become Alleanza Nazionale (AN).32 If the PDS had found itself in the 
awkward position of having to prove its democratic credentials, for the MSI the 
question could not even be posed: it had none. The MSI had, in fact, constantly opposed 
the Constitution, which it did not contribute to writing, throughout the republican 
period. The only way to provide some historical legitimacy to the presence of a post-
fascist party in the republican government was thus, on the one hand, to devaluate anti-
fascism, presenting it as outdated and, on the other, to downgrade opponents, namely 
the post-communist left, to the same status of historical illegitimacy which 
characterized the post-fascists. As far as the former tendency is concerned, the way 
had been paved, on the historiographical plane, by the work of the historian Renzo 
De Felice. His monumental and rather controversial biography of Mussolini, 
published in eight volumes between 1965 and 1997, had somewhat weakened in 
public opinion the perception of antifascism as a fundamental value of the post-
war republican regime, and De Felice himself ended up conferring to his studies a 
political direction when, at the end of the eighties, he claimed that antifascism had 
historically served the purpose of legitimizing the PCI as a democratic party, and 
                                                 
31 Berlusconi repeatedly used anticommunism in his propaganda, for example, he 
promoted The Black book of Communism, edited by Stéphane Courtois in 1997, during 
the 2001 electoral campaign, see Agosti, ‘La nemesi del patto costituente’, op. cit., 263.  
32 Carlo Ruzza and Stefano Fella Re-inventing the Italian Right, Territorial politics, 
populism and ‘post-fascism’ (London 2009), 27 – 29.  
that this had eventually turned into an obstacle to much-needed political 
reforms.33 The right-wing historiography of the second republic, in turn, strived 
in particular to prove that the post-communist left had no more historical right to 
govern than had the post-fascist right. The rhetorical technique deployed by several 
authors to achieve such a result has been defined as Rovescismo (Reversism)34, and 
consisted in charging the communists with the same allegations historically ascribed to 
fascists: if fascists had fought for the triumph of Hitler, the communist partisans had 
fought for a scarcely better cause: the supremacy of communism, that is Stalinism, over 
Italy. Because many fascists had been involved in several plots against democracy, with 
at least one attempted military coup in 197035, a number of right-wing historians, with 
the aim of maintaining the parallelism described above, sustained tout court the 
subversive nature of the PCI and, in order to prove the point, alleged the existence of a 
secret paramilitary structure within the party. The existence of a communist apparato 
di riserva (reserve apparatus) – the definition is Giulio Seniga's36 - is confirmed by the 
historiography.37 The apparato seems to have been established in order for the party to 
have at its disposal a structure ready to react to a putative military coup by anti-
                                                 
33 Borden W. Painter, Jr. ‘Renzo De Felice and the historiography of Italian 
Fascism’ The American Historical Review, 95, 2 (Apr. 1990), pp. 391 – 405. De 
Felice, in particular, stressed the difference between being antifascist and being 
democratic, denying a direct correlation between the two positions. On this point 
see Renzo de Felice and Pasquale Chessa Rosso e nero (Milano 1995), 24 – 25.  
34 A. d’Orsi ‛Dal revisionismo al rovescismo. La Resistenza (e la Costituzione) sotto 
attacco’, in A. Del Boca, op. cit., 329 – 372.  
35 Camillo Arcuri Colpo di stato. Storia vera di un’inchiesta censurata (Milano 2004).  
36 Massimo Caprara Lavoro riservato. I cassetti segreti del PCI (Milano 1997), 78. 
37 Pietro di Loreto Togliatti e la “doppiezza”. Il PCI tra democrazia e insurrezione 
(1944 – 1949) (Bologna 1991), 65; Adriano Guerra Comunismi e comunisti. Dalle 
«svolte» di Togliatti e Stalin del 1944 al crollo del comunismo democratico (Bari 2005), 
144 – 148. Victor Zaslavsky, Lo stalinismo e la sinistra italiana (Milano 2004).  
communist or anti-democratic forces. There is no definitive proof, either in the PCI's 
archives or in the Government's, that this structure was conceived in preparation for an 
insurrection. It therefore seems more the response to a sense of insecurity than evidence 
of an intention to strike. This apparato must not be confused with the historical fact 
that many partisan brigades autonomously decided to be prepared for the eventuality of 
a future insurrection, hiding the best of their military equipment at the end of the war.38 
Interpreting all of this in various, and frequently imaginative ways, several journalists 
and right-wing historians tried to suggest the presence of two separate levels of 
organization within the Party. Besides the legal and official structure, there was an 
underground layer of well-trained paramilitary troops, awaiting the order to engage in 
civil war. The curious aspect of this affair is that the only Italian paramilitary 
organization, whose existence was proved beyond any doubt, because it was confirmed 
by the Italian Government in 1990, was the anti-communist Gladio, a NATO ‘stay 
behind’ operation.39 Therefore a large part of the interest generated by the communist 
                                                 
38 It has been argued that, while Togliatti was urging communist partisans to hand back 
their weapons, other sectors of the party, under the influence of the powerful deputy 
secretary of the party Pietro Secchia, were secretly establishing opposite directives. 
This is the much debated issue of the so-called doppiezza (duplicity) of the PCI, namely 
the tendency of many cadres and comrades to believe that the PCI's struggle for 
democracy was only a veil hiding the real aim of the party's activity, which was the 
preparation of the Communist revolution. The expression doppiezza is by Palmiro 
Togliatti who, in a speech delivered in 1956, invited once and for all the Party to get rid 
of ‛a certain atmosphere of doppiezza’, see Di Loreto, op. cit., 7. On the issue of the 
doppiezza see also Renzo Martinelli Storia del Partito comunista Italiano. Il «partito 
nuovo» dalla Liberazione al 18 aprile (Torino 1995), 257; Franco Andreucci Falce e 
martello. Identità e linguaggi dei comunisti italiani fra stalinismo e Guerra fredda 
(Bologna 2005), 51-55; Andra Guiso La seconda guerra mondiale nella “memoria 
storica” del PCF e del PCI (1945 – 1956), in La seconda guerra mondiale e la sua 
memoria, ed. P. Craveri and Gaetano Quagliariello (Catanzaro 2006), 560 – 66.  
39 Piero Craveri La Repubblica dal 1958 al 1992 (Torino 1995), 981 – 983.  
apparato - promptly labelled Gladio rossa (Red Gladio) by the media - ultimately 
seems to have been a polemical reaction to the revelations regarding this right-wing 
structure which recruited many former fascists and others whose democratic credentials 
were, at the very least, questionable. The issue of the PCI apparatus is probably the 
most striking example of the public use of the history of the PCI in the second republic. 
It was initially brought to the attention of the wider public by a scoop in the 
magazine L'Europeo, in May 1991, then investigated for three years by the Public 
Prosecutor's office in Rome (with no tangible results), while also being boosted by 
several publications40 and countless articles in different newspapers. It was even 
discussed in the Commissione stragi of the Italian Parliament, a Committee formed by 
MPs to investigate, with the input of historians, the causes of terrorism in Italy. 41 The 
Committee was not able to come to any shared conclusions on this particular matter, 
and eventually presented to the Parliament conflicting reports. In 2001, the historian 
and adviser to the committee Gianni Donno published one of the above-mentioned 
reports bearing the less than imaginative title of La Gladio rossa del PCI. This book 
does not actually contain any evidence of the existence of the PCI's paramilitary 
structure, unless we are to consider as evidence the paranoid reports of the local prefects 
during the 1950s, replete with revelations, ‘from an anonymous source’, on plans for 
                                                 
40 For example Gian Paolo Pellizzaro Gladio Rossa – Dossier sulla più potente banda 
armata esistita in Italia (Roma 1997).  
41 Rocco Turi Gladio Rossa. Una catena di complotti e delitti dal dopoguerra al caso 
Moro (Venezia 2004), 274 – 82, according to the author the mani pulite investigation 
was a smoke screen set up in order to divert the attention of public opinion from the 
Gladio rossa affair which could embarrass both the former communist leaders and the 
Christian democrat ones, who had tolerated the presence of this structure. The Gladio 
rossa case was re-opened by judges in 2001 and definitively closed the following year, 
Turi, op. cit., 342 – 43. 
insurrections that, it is worth reiterating, never actually took place, to be carried out 
using weapons ‘which were impossible to find’.42 In the presentation of the book, the 
former military officer and vice president of the Commissione stragi Vincenzo Manca 
frankly admitted that only the retrieval of the PCI’s ‘secret archive’ - the existence of 
which was assumed even though its whereabouts was (and still remains) unknown – 
could have represented a smoking gun in order to prove the PCI's subversive activity. 
Nonetheless, Donno judged the available documentation as solid enough to argue the 
complicity of the PCI with the Red Brigades.43  
Although the discussion surrounding Togliatti's responsibilities in the 1930s and 
the issue of the Gladio rossa represented a political embarrassment for the PDS, 
the PCI’s democratic reputation was not irreparably compromised, as it was 
principally founded on the Svolta di Salerno policy. It is worth recalling the outlines 
of the Svolta policy according to traditional left-wing historiography. In April 1944 
Palmiro Togliatti, who had just arrived in the south of Italy from Moscow, declared that 
the Italian Communist Party was ready to cooperate with the king in the name of the 
common struggle against the Nazi-fascist forces which were still occupying the centre 
and the north of the country. He thus proposed to the other political parties of the C.L.N. 
(Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale / National Liberation Committee) to join the 
Badoglio Government, which was the political expression of the conservative 
                                                 
42 On the use by historians of Italian police reports concerning the activity of the left-
wing parties in the fifties see the acute remarks by A. Ballone ‛Storiografia e storia del 
PCI’, Passato e Presente, 12, 33 (September – December 1994): 129 – 146, which 
urged caution in dealing with such documents which were evidently affected by the 
Cold War political climate. 
43 Gianni Donno La Gladio Rossa del PCI (1945 – 1967) (Soveria Mannelli 2001), 
133.  
establishment compromised by fascism. This move was interpreted as clear proof of 
Togliatti's patriotism: instead of endorsing a political shift to the left, the communist 
leader, showing a great sense of responsibility, proposed cooperation with the very 
figures and institutions that had persecuted the communists for years. This reading of 
the Svolta di Salerno was promoted by the PCI itself as a key propaganda tool and was, 
by and large, accepted by historiography: for a trenchant statement of this view there is 
no better example than Donald Sassoon’s classic text, The Strategy of the Italian 
Communist Party.44 As was the case with other publications,45 the central thesis of this 
book was that the European communist parties, and especially the PCI, enjoyed a 
relative degree of autonomy from Moscow in the years 1943 -1947. Togliatti had thus 
been able to take some important autonomous decisions and to develop the ‘Italian road 
to socialism’ policy which, after a parenthesis due to the flare-up of the Cold War, 
between 1947 and 1956, allowed the Italian Communist Party to develop a democratic 
and pluralist vision of communism, increasingly distant from the Soviet model. Once 
adopted, this interpretation led to further conclusions: Togliatti's political strategy was 
consistent with Antonio Gramsci’s thought, particularly in relation to his concepts of 
‘cultural hegemony’ and ‘war of position’46, and both had been physically embodied, 
                                                 
44 Donald Sassoon The Strategy of the Italian Communist Party. From the Resistance 
to the Historic Compromise (London 1981). The same claim is made by Paolo Spriano 
La Resistenza, Togliatti e il Partito Nuovo, vol. 5 of the Storia del Partito comunista 
italiano (Einaudi 1975), 282 – 313. 
45 See Paolo Spriano I comunisti europei e Stalin (Torino 1983), 258 – 268; Joan Bart 
Urban Moscow and the Italian Communist Party, from Togliatti to Berlinguer (London 
1986), 184 – 224.  
46 An analysis of the literature on Togliatti’s elaboration, or rather exploitation, of 
Gramsci’s thought is beyond the scope of the present essay; see Stephen Gundle ‘The 
legacy of the prison notebooks’ in Italy in the Cold War. Politics, culture and society 
(1948 – 1958), ed. C. Duggan and Christopher Wagstaff (Oxford 1995), 131 - 47. 
in the post-war period, by the so-called partito nuovo, another remarkable Togliatti 
invention. No longer a platoon of professional revolutionaries, according to the Leninist 
model of the vanguard party, the partito nuovo was rather a mass-based party, designed 
to encourage people's peaceful participation in the political life of a fledgling 
democracy. The Svolta di Salerno policy was therefore a sort of mainstay on which a 
comprehensive and coherent historiographical tradition was established. There were 
also alternative readings of the Svolta which contested the mainstream interpretation 
from both a left-wing and a right-wing perspectives, but these had enjoyed significantly 
less influence. One of the most authoritative was by the left-wing political scientist and 
historian Giorgio Galli who, in opposition to the theory of the PCI's autonomy from 
Moscow, claimed that no understanding of the nature and the history of the Italian 
Communist party was possible by disregarding the so-called legame di ferro, the iron 
link, which indissolubly bonded the Italian communist party to its elder brother, the 
PCUS, and the Soviet Union. Galli accused Togliatti of having worked to restrict 
the social and political aspirations of the Italian workers, in the years 1944 – 1947, 
in order to conform to Stalin's wishes of not jeopardizing relations with the US, 
whereas the Italian working class was in actual fact politically ready and strong 
enough to achieve much more in terms of political gains.47 Similar conclusions, but 
from a right - wing perspective tending to depict Togliatti as Stalin's agent, were 
expressed by Sergio Bertelli.48 The book that, in the 1990s, re-opened the debate 
                                                 
47 Giorgio Galli Storia del PCI, the first of many editions of this classic was published 
by Schwarz in 1953, the most recent by Kaos Edizioni, in 1993.  
48 Sergio Bertelli Il gruppo. La formazione del gruppo dirigente del PCI, 1936 – 1948 
(Milano 1980), 197 – 202.  
around the Svolta di Salerno was Sul Pci. Un’interpretazione storica, by Nicola 
Gallerano and Marcello Flores. Published in 1992, this work represents a sort of 
watershed, invariably quoted by subsequent publications, as the two left-wing 
historians set in motion a process of dismantling the political myths surrounding the 
history of the PCI, an approach which would characterize the historiographical debate 
for the next decade. While many of the interpretations within the book - like the claim 
that the real aim of the partigiani della pace campaign was to grant the USSR enough 
time to reach a military parity with the US before an eventual confrontation 49 - may 
have troubled former communists, the most potentially damaging with respect to the 
PCI’s democratic reputation concerned the Svolta di Salerno. The two historians argued 
that the Svolta, not unlike the rest of Togliatti's policies of the period, should have been 
primarily interpreted as related to Soviet foreign policy: in all likelihood the 
mastermind behind the Svolta di Salerno was Stalin, with Togliatti no more than the 
executor of orders designed to consolidate the anti-Nazi coalition, dispelling any 
suspicions about the Soviet Union's intentions for post-war Italy. The adoption of the 
new political strategy by the PCI's leaders in Italy, a policy which was in stark contrast 
with what the PCI had professed until the return of Togliatti, was unequivocal evidence 
of the communists’ subjection to Soviet tactical design. The authors spoke of ‘a sort of 
schizophrenia’ of the Italian communist leaders: claims of political autonomy and 
effective subordination to Moscow coexisted without significant contradictions, ‘two 
sides of the same coin’, to quote the expression used in the book. Even eminent figures 
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of the PCI's Italian leadership who had firstly opposed the Svolta, including Giorgio 
Amendola, eventually endorsed it because, not unlike the other party leaders politically 
formed in the third international, he considered the international dimension of every 
political question as prominent, and the defence of the interests of the Soviet Union as 
a priority.50 Gallerano and Flores did not present any new evidence supporting their 
claims, which seemed to develop organically from the precise historical moment in 
which they published their work, a time characterized by the collapse of the democratic 
paradigm which had been associated with the PCI since 1944. It was therefore 
surprising that the first document from the Soviet archives, which had appeared at the 
end of 1991, seemed actually to corroborate the theory of Togliatti's autonomous 
elaboration of the Svolta di Salerno. This was the so-called memorandum Sui compiti 
attuali dei comunisti italiani (On the current duties of the Italian communists), by 
Palmiro Togliatti, dated 1 March 1944. The memorandum was divided into two parts: 
one containing the well known formulation of the Svolta di Salerno and the other 
(undoubtedly the first draft) its complete antithesis, namely a political platform centred 
on a request for abdication by the Italian King as a precondition for communist 
cooperation with a national government, as well as a firm opposition to the leadership 
of Badoglio. According to Aldo Agosti, who discovered and first published the 
document,51 it proved that all options were explored by the Soviet leadership until the 
very last moment, and that Togliatti had to work hard to make Stalin finally accept his 
                                                 
50 First hand account of the debate about the Svolta in the Roman and Milan centre of 
the PCI is in Giorgio Amendola Lettere a Milano. Ricordi e documenti, 1939 - 1945 
(Roma 1973); cfr. Luigi Longo I centri dirigenti del PCI nella Resistenza (Roma 1977). 
51 Aldo Agosti ‛Salerno '44: I dubbi di Togliatti’, l'Unità, 28 October 1991, 11. 
point of view, which corresponded to the final draft of the document. In 1994, however, 
the Russian historian Michail M. Narinskij challenged this interpretation and claimed 
that Stalin was the real and sole mind behind the Svolta di Salerno, which was probably 
imposed on a reluctant Togliatti after a meeting between the two during the night 
between 3 and 4 March 1944, proved beyond reasonable doubt by then newly available 
documents.52 The increasingly accessible Soviet documents fed into the publications of 
Elena Aga Rossi and Victor Zaslavsky, both of whom seriously questioned the 
traditional interpretation of the PCI's autonomy from Moscow. In their essay The Soviet 
Union and the Italian Communist Party 1944 – 48, the PCI was defined as ‘a major 
instrument of Soviet geopolitical interest’.53 According to the authors, who largely 
based their research on the reports sent to Moscow by Kostylev, the Soviet ambassador 
in Rome, the Italian communist leaders were continuously seeking advice from the 
Soviets, with whom they had meetings on a regular basis, discussing virtually every 
aspect of their political activity, including the PCI's economic programme for the 
reconstruction of the country. Rossi and Zaslavsky concluded that: ‘The documents 
demonstrate that the degree of Soviet control over the PCI leadership was very high, 
and undoubtedly higher than previously recognized by historians. All major initiatives 
                                                 
52 Michail M. Narinskij ‛Togliatti, Stalin e la Svolta di Salerno’ Studi Storici, 35, 3 
(July – September 1994): 657 – 66. Shortly after the same claim was made in a paper 
by Elena Aga Rossi and Victor Zaslavsky entitled ‛La politica estera di Stalin e il caso 
Italiano’, presented at the conference ‛Unione Sovietica e l' Europa nella guerra fredda’ 
organized by the Fondazione Insituto Gramsci in Cortona, in 23 and 24 September 
1994, and whose anti-Togliatti character was deliberately advertised in the media, see 
for example Dino Messina ‛Salerno 1944, La Svolta di Stalin’, Corriere della Sera, 17 
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53 Elena Aga Rossi and Victor Zaslavsky ‛The Soviet Union and the Italian Communist 
Party 1944 – 48’, in The Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War 1943 – 1953, ed. F. 
Gori and Silvio Pons (New York 1996), 161.  
on the part of the PCI had to receive Soviet authorization.’54 Togliatti, ‘a moderate 
Stalinist’,55 committed the leadership of the party to a relentless effort to contain, 
moderate and eventually halt Italian workers' revolutionary spirit, preventing any 
insurrection in order to meet Stalin's desires. The authors thus endorsed the gauchiste 
interpretation of the historic function of the PCI within Italian democracy, which had 
been proposed by Giorgio Galli and, more recently, by Arturo Peregalli.56 The theory 
of Togliatti's submissiveness to the Soviets was reiterated in two books published the 
following year by Aga Rossi: L'altra faccia della luna, conference proceedings edited 
in collaboration with Gaetano Quagliariello, which represented the first attempt to reach 
a new comparison between the French Communist Party and the PCI, an excellent 
example of comparative historiography, in the light of the newly available documents57; 
and Togliatti e Stalin, written with Victor Zaslavsky, which developed their essay of the 
previous year.58 In the latter, the authors engaged in a merciless analysis of the 
traditional historiography of the PCI, effectively rejecting the validity of past 
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(Genova, 1991). 
57 Aga Rossi and Quaglieriello, op. cit. The central thesis of the book is that the 
ideological and political difference between the PCI and the PCF had been 
overestimated by the historiography: the subordination to the Soviets was a common 
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published after the eclipse of European communism, had stressed how the political 
differences between the Italian communist ‛Giraffe’ and the ‘Incorruptible’ PCF were 
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Rouge. Les Partis communistes français et italien de la Libération à nos jours (Paris 
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58 Aga Rossi and Zaslavsky, Togliatti e Stalin, op. cit., a book promptly advertised by 
mass media, see for example Gianni Corbi, ‘Stalin ordinava e Togliatti eseguiva’, the 
Repubblica, 18 November 1997, 40.  
interpretations because of the ignorance on the part of their authors of the Soviet 
documents. They claimed that most of the research into the PCI was essentially ‘based 
on Togliatti's official statements’59 and revealed particular hostility towards more recent 
works, such as the biography of Palmiro Togliatti by Aldo Agosti60, defined as ‘obsolete 
– one last homage to the Cold War’61, and Roberto Gualtieri's Togliatti e la politica 
estera italiana.62 To some extent this polemical approach was a hint of a sort of 
showdown within Italian academic circles. Many of the most illustrious historians who 
occupied prestigious positions within the major Italian universities had left-wing 
political orientations, and were very often former members of the communist party. For 
many less famous, non-communist scholars the new political climate, coupled with 
such remarkable abundance of new evidence emerging from the Soviet archives, 
represented a unique and long-awaited occasion to hit the headlines with sensational 
claims, while taking revenge against colleagues who had ruled the roost for decades. 
This does not necessarily mean that their works lacked historical accuracy, an 
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60 Aldo Agosti Togliatti (Torino 1996). In order to counter the allegations Agosti made 
his own personal investigation in the Soviet archives. The new documents he acquired 
were collected in Aldo Agosti Togliatti negli anni del Comintern (1926 – 1943) (Roma 
2000). In the introduction the author claimed he could not find any reason to modify 
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61 Aga Rossi and Zaslavsky, Togliatti e Stalin, op. cit, 21.  
62 Roberto Gualtieri Togliatti e la politica estera italiana (Roma 1995). Gualtieri had 
proposed an alternative interpretation of the origins of the Svolta di Salerno policy in 
order to overcome both the classic attribution of its paternity and the new Stalinist one. 
According to him, the turn was Togliatti's personal elaboration, and he engineered it 
because he believed it was the best option to promote the development of the 
international communist movement. While Stalin was mostly concerned with the 
consolidation of the Eastern block, Togliatti hoped for a future Europe not divided in 
blocks as he considered it the best possible scenario for both for the USSR and the PCI. 
accusation that could not be levelled at Aga Rossi and her fellow writers, for example, 
but it may account for the harsh tone of some of their historiographical remarks. On 
the other hand, the polemical use of PCI history by the right-wing historiography 
was preceding relentlessly and it widened to new issues such as, for example, the 
so-called Oro di Mosca, namely the Soviet funding to the PCI.63 Right-wing 
revisionism probably reached its pinnacle in 2001, when Sergio Bertelli and 
Francesco Bigazzi edited what could be defined as the ultimate anthology of ready-
for-political-use facts and interpretations on the Italian Communist party: Pci, la 
storia dimenticata (the forgotten history). The essays in the book, including 
contributions by authors like the unrepentant fascist Giorgio Pisanò (rimuovi questa 
parte – è Paolo Pisanò, fratello di Giorgio) , sketched a comprehensive history of the 
PCI that could be briefly summarised as follows: the Italian communist party was 
originally created by Bolshevik agents and, having weakened the Italian Socialist party, 
was ultimately responsible for the advent of Fascism. The military activity against the 
Nazi occupation and the Repubblica Sociale Italiana was a ‘private war’ waged by a 
communist minority with the purpose of establishing a Stalinist dictatorship imposed 
on the other groups of the Italian resistance, which would rather have waited for 
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liberation by allied troops. At the end of the war communist militiamen killed thousands 
of innocent people because ‘this was the logic of Katyn’.64 The PCI not only conspired 
against democracy in the republican period, but also infiltrated the judiciary, and the 
mani pulite investigation was nothing more than a communist plot. 
These various polemical motivations aroused what has been defined as a 
‘historiographical Cold War’ among Italian historians65. It was, on the other hand, 
inevitable that the expansion of the revisionist literature that had characterized the 
1990s would eventually provoke a polemical reaction by left-wing historians intent on 
defending the memory of the PCI and thus the democratic legitimacy of its political 
heirs. A large group of scholars associated with the Fondazione Istituto Gramsci66 took 
the task on, organizing two conferences: Il PCI nell'Italia Repubblicana,67 in 2000, and 
Togliatti nel suo tempo,68 in 2004. In the preface to the 2000 conference proceedings, 
Giuseppe Vacca explicitly polemicized with Aga Rossi and Zaslavsky, openly accusing 
them of political speculation:  
The thesis of their book is very clear: the history of the European communist 
parties is nothing more than the history of Soviet foreign policy, what is more 
such an interpretation is based on simplified and mono causal schemes. […] One 
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65 The expression is by Guido Formigoni, in Roberto Gualtieri, ed., Il PCI nell’Italia 
repubblicana (Roma 2001), 329. 
66 On the scientific board of Fondazione Istituto Gramsci of Rome there were many of 
the most important Italian historians, including Francesco Barbagallo, Nicola 
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67 Gualtieri, Il PCI nell’Italia repubblicana, op. cit. 
68 Gualtieri, Spagnolo and Taviani, op. cit. 
could object that the journalistic success of a thesis, elaborated for political 
purposes, is not sufficient reason to discuss it among scholars.69 
Whatever the reasons behind the revisionists' theses, they nevertheless merited 
discussion and, indeed, the conference was organized in order to contest them in the 
historiographical arena. The main bone of contention was the alleged subordination of 
Togliatti's PCI to Moscow. In the face of the trenchant use of the Soviet archival 
evidence by the new historiography, the traditional vision of the PCI as an independent 
and purely national political party was no longer tenable. The only way to face the 
revisionists’ challenge was thus to rewrite partially the history of the PCI, applying new 
interpretative criteria in order to overcome the dilemma of autonomy versus 
subordination to Moscow. This is why Giuseppe Vacca suggested the adoption of 
doppia lealtà (divided loyalty) as a key interpretative criterion for analysing the 
political panorama of post-war Italy. Firstly proposed by the historian Franco De 
Felice,70 doppia lealtà was a sort of leitmotiv during the 2000 conference. Its intention 
was to express the historical awareness that every decision taken by the PCI's leadership 
was necessarily influenced by the political framework of the Cold War and it could 
therefore always be interpreted as the outcome of the interaction between national and 
international factors. Doppia lealtà, far from being an exclusive feature of the PCI, was 
a common condition of any political leadership in any European country during the 
Cold War era. This was the case, for example, for the Democrazia Cristiana, whose 
loyalty was divided between Italy and the Atlantic pact. In his intervention, Ernesto 
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Galli della Loggia trenchantly challenged the historiographical validity of this theory: 
if employed so widely, doppia lealtà was no longer useful in order to describe the 
specific and very tight bond of Togliatti and the PCI with the Soviet Union. Besides, 
the loyalty of the Democrazia Cristiana to the Atlantic pact was absolutely coherent 
with both the democratic values on which the Italian Republic was established, and the 
will of the majority of Italians. This was not the case with the PCI, whose ‘half loyalty’ 
was for the Soviet Union, which was to be considered an enemy power. According to 
Galli della Loggia, the criterion proposed at the time by Giorgio Galli, the legame di 
ferro, remained the most useful to understand the relationship between the PCI and the 
Soviet Union. A central element of the PCI's connection to the Soviet Union, one which 
had been neglected during the conference, was the strong ideological link. The fidelity 
to the USSR was first and foremost a fidelity to communism, namely the conviction 
that communist ideology was right despite any possible failure and error in political 
praxis.71 The historiographical fortune of the doppia lealtà approach ended with that 
conference. Four years later, in the 2004 conference, the climate had changed. Elena 
Aga Rossi had been invited, and it was clear that the new historiography, meanwhile, 
had gained full legitimacy among left-wing historians too. Nonetheless this conference 
represented a further attempt to break, so to speak, the iron link, without resorting to 
the traditional theory of autonomy. The declared purpose of the paper by Carlo 
Spagnolo, Togliatti e il movimento comunista internazionale,72 as well as of the 
introduction to the conference proceedings by Roberto Gualtieri, Carlo Spagnolo and 
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Ermanno Taviani, was to divert the focus from the relationship between Togliatti and 
Stalin, or Togliatti and Moscow, to that between Togliatti and the communist movement 
as a whole. Because Togliatti was one of the most important and respected leaders in 
the communist world, his political activity could not be read as mere obedience to his 
Soviet masters. As far as the acceptance of democracy by the PCI was concerned, 
the existence of the partito nuovo provided sufficient evidence that the Italian 
Communist Party had endorsed, if not liberal democracy, at least the Italian 
democratic system, and since 1944. Within this interpretation the partito nuovo 
was in fact to be regarded as: 
The principal and most original of Togliatti's gifts to […] the Italian peasants 
and industrial workers, advancing their integration into a democratic and 
parliamentary system from which the Italian masses had been historically 
excluded due to the anarchist tradition.73  
Moreover, the famous Yalta Memorandum, the document compiled by the PCI 
leader shortly before dying in Crimea, and addressing the problems of the 
international communist movement, revealed that Togliatti, towards the end of his 
life, engaged in an ambitious attempt to revitalize the international communist 
movement, whose signs of crisis he gradually acknowledged before anyone else, 
encouraging a democratization of the communist regimes, to be carried out 
following the example of the Italian Communist Party.74 This reading actually seems 
an anachronism, as such a political project, if we are to accept the interpretation of 
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Silvio Pons75, should be ascribed instead to Enrico Berlinguer, more than a decade later. 
As far as the Partito nuovo as an original model within the communist movement was 
concerned, Giovanni Gozzini, in his conference paper, showed how Stalin had endorsed 
Togliatti's decision to create a mass-based party, judging such a decision as inevitable 
in a nation characterized by a multi-party political system.76 Pons, in another paper 
entitled Togliatti e Stalin, tried to reach a position of compromise on the specific issue 
of the Svolta di Salerno, within the more general question of the Stalin-Togliatti 
relationship. His conclusions were, overall, balanced and well grounded in both 
previous literature and archival evidence. Togliatti's subordination to Stalin was to be 
considered absolute in the period he was in Moscow. The Svolta di Salerno, therefore, 
was to be interpreted as having been engineered by the Soviet dictator. The classic 
representation of the Stalin – Togliatti link was to be revised: it was Togliatti who had 
sought a tight political relationship with the Soviet dictator, rather then the other way 
round, as such a relationship represented the real source of legitimisation of the PCI in 
the eyes of Italian workers.77 Once Togliatti had established his undisputed leadership 
over the party, his degree of autonomy from Moscow progressively increased. In 1951, 
Togliatti was eventually strong enough to refuse, against Stalin's wishes, the leadership 
of the Cominform, implicitly questioning the political line of the Soviet dictator. In her 
intervention as conference discussant, Aga Rossi, though expressing appreciation for 
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76 Giovanni Gozzini ‘La democrazia dei partiti e il “partito nuovo’’’, in Gualtieri, 
Spagnolo and Taviani, op. cit, 298. 
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Pons's paper, contested the pro-Togliatti and ideological nature of the conference, and 
claimed that no real progress had been made towards a more balanced judgement since 
the previous conference organized by the Fondazione Istituto Gramsci.78 As had been 
the case with the original Cold War, no peace treaty was signed to mark the end of the 
historiographical version. Nonetheless, it decreased in intensity in the following years 
due to the fact that, as time passed, the communist origins of the Italian left was losing 
its value as a propaganda tool. The reciprocal positions on single questions, like the 
Svolta di Salerno, did not mutate significantly in the publications which followed,79 but 
the overall perception of the role of Togliatti in Italian post-war history was certainly 
no longer as positive as it had been at the end of the 1980s, even among left-wing 
historians. Claims by the right-wing historiography have also deeply influenced 
public opinion and are currently used, ça va sans dire, by many politicians in their 
public activity. To cite just one recent example, in 2010 the President of the 
Province of Salerno issued a poster marking the annual celebration of 25 April 
(Liberation day) in which he expressed gratitude to the US troops, and exclusively 
to the US troops, for having liberated Italy and Europe from communism80. Such 
a restricted, to say the least, reading of World War II is clearly the consequence of 
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the above-mentioned historical interpretations which configure an altogether 
different history of Italy which is not only anti-communist but essentially anti-
republican and implicitly, albeit often involuntarily, pro-fascist. [line break] 
 
Public and political use of history has had remarkable consequences on the PCI’s 
historiographical reassessment over the last twenty years. It has seen the perpetuation 
of a historiographical tradition which had always privileged the ideological and political 
dimension of PCI history, especially in the 1960s and 1970s.81 Ideological issues, as 
well as the PCI's international links, were indeed the most easily exploitable topics in 
the political arena. As a consequence, and regrettably, a different line of research which 
had begun in the 1980s, focused on the relationship between the PCI and Italian 
society82, has not developed since. Moreover, the nonchalant political use of history 
which characterized the Italian historiographical debate from the collapse of 
communism onwards has induced a loss of historical perspective. Both left-wing and 
right-wing historians have been debating the history of the PCI within the highly 
charged framework of the current political situation. Right-wing historiography has 
obsessively focused on a few specific features of the Togliatti’s partito nuovo, such as 
its Stalinist imprint, in order to damage the PDS, the only party to have survived the 
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end of the first republic, albeit following a change of the party’s name.83 Left-wing 
historiography, on the other hand, has accepted the challenge on such a treacherous 
battlefield and has stubbornly strived to prove that the PCI was a sincere supporter of 
the Western democratic model. The paradoxical result is that Palmiro Togliatti, a 
communist leader, has been positively judged by left-wing historiography for what he 
did in order to consolidate a Western-style democratic system he did not appreciate and 
wanted to surpass, albeit in the long term.  
The long debate to determine the exact grade of Togliatti's autonomy in developing the 
political strategy of the Svolta di Salerno has been important, on the one hand, in order 
to definitively dismantle some of the traditional historical myths surrounding Togliatti's 
PCI: its autonomy from Moscow and its supposed ideological uniqueness within the 
international communist movement. On the other hand, it is difficult not to conclude 
that such research, having been focused principally on the Party leadership and on its 
ideological and international dimension, has not significantly improved our 
understanding of the PCI as a political phenomenon in post-war Italian society. Such 
an approach is inadequate in order to fully explain some of the PCI's most remarkable 
features: the motivations for militancy of so many workers and intellectuals, the 
political, social and even psychological expectations the party was able to nourish and 
to fulfil. As far as the Stalinism of the PCI is concerned, it would probably be much 
more profitable, as Maurizio Bertolotti suggests, to view Stalinism through an 
anthropological approach and, therefore, to study it as a ‘relevant cultural phenomenon, 
                                                 
83 On this point see the compelling analysis by David I. Kertzer Politics and symbols. 
The Italian Communist Party and the Fall of Communism (New Haven 1996), 64 – 83.  
 
that affected the thought of millions of farm labourers and workers’,84 rather than as a 
personal tendency in a few political leaders. It is therefore time for a new era of research 
which can benefit from interdisciplinary methodologies as well as from oral history, 
addressing the social and cultural motivation of communist militancy.85 Furthermore, a 
new era of study of the PCI could develop from an analysis of other little-studied 
aspects of its history, such as the economic, social and cultural reasons for the 
impressive and longstanding electoral success of the PCI in the so-called regioni rosse 
(red regions).86 Lastly, a new trend of research on the PCI's cultural production, which 
deeply influenced the Italian post-war cultural panorama, would be welcomed. Some 
important books on this topic have already been published. Authors have focused 
particularly on the relations between the PCI and Italians intellectuals, and on 
how communist culture evolved in response to the modernisation and 
industrialisation of the country.87 More research could be carried out on specific 
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Giorgio Galli, in the preface of the 1977 edition of his Storia del Pci had already 
mentioned the need to write a history of the PCI ‘different from those so far published’ 
that would consider ‘its social impact, unique to the history of Italian parties – and the 
abundant material that documents it (from the labour struggles … to the minutes of 
meetings from the grassroots organizations)’, Galli, op. cit., V.  
87 Nello Ajello Il lungo addio. Intellettuali e PCI dal 1958 al 1991 (Bari-Roma 1997). 
aspects, such as the visual culture of the PCI and its cinematographic and television 
production,88 in order to develop a complete reconsideration of the role of the Italian 
Communist Party, twenty years after its end, in the history of Italy. 
To some extent, the historiographical debate on the Italian Communist Party will never 
be entirely free of political concerns, at least not in the short term. However, this does 
not necessarily represent an obstacle. The public and political use of history have to be 
considered as part of the PCI’s legacy, and therefore analysed and discussed as 
historical phenomena.  
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